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Introduction
In Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,1 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are enforceable for securities
disputes.  Since that decision in 1987, the dominant method for resolving
investment-related disputes between clients and broker-dealers or their rep-
resentatives in the U.S. has been through arbitration conducted by the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).2  FINRA handles more
than 99% of securities-related mediations and arbitrations in the U.S.3
However, despite the importance of FINRA arbitration in the U.S., few
pieces have been written comparing the U.S. system with financial services
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems available in other countries
and evaluating the quality of the FINRA system.4
The problem is finding a point of comparison.  That is, which country
has been successful in regulating its financial markets while using a regime
that is similar enough to the American model to make a useful compari-
son?  One country that stands out as a great candidate for such a compari-
son is South Africa.  According to the Global Economic Competitiveness
Report, South Africa is ranked third in the world for its overall financial
market development and is among the ten best in the world in terms of
legal rights in its financial markets.5  In addition to its success, the South
African financial regime also shares much in common with the regulatory
structure in the U.S., having both a national financial services regulator
and a special ADR system for dealing with disputes between clients and
1. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
2. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ARBITRATION, MEDIATION
AND THE NEUTRALS WHO SERVE 1 (2011) [hereinafter FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION], availa-
ble at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/@fdr/docu-
ments/arbmed/p124105.pdf.
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., Shahla F. Ali & Antonio Da Roza, Alternative Dispute Resolution Design
in Financial Markets— Some More Equal Than Others: Hong Kong’s Proposed Financial Dis-
pute Resolution Center in the Context of the Experience in the United Kingdom, United
States, Australia, and Singapore, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 485 (2012) (comparing Hong
Kong’s proposed system with the U.S.’s); Cory Alpert, Financial Services in the United
States and United Kingdom: Comparative Approaches to Securities Regulation and Dispute
Resolution, 5 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 75 (2008) (comparing the U.S. system to the
United Kingdom’s); Ombudsman: An Attractive Alternative to FINRA Mediation?, FLA.
INT’L UNIV. INVESTOR CLINIC (Dec. 15, 2011), http://fiuinvestorclinic.wordpress.com/
2011/12/15/ombudsman-an-attractive-alternative-to-finra-mediation/ (comparing
FINRA ADR to the Canadian system).
5. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012– 2013 at
324– 25 (Klaus Schwab ed., 2012).
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financial services providers.6
In the U.S., most disputes between clients and broker-dealers or their
representatives are resolved in arbitration through FINRA.7  In South
Africa, the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Ombud (FAIS
Ombud) runs the ADR system.8  In both systems, a customer who files a
qualifying complaint has the right to have her case resolved under the alter-
native system rather than through traditional litigation, and the result of
the alternative system is binding.9  The parties benefit because ADR is
more efficient and less costly than traditional litigation.10  The court sys-
tem benefits since cases that would otherwise be litigated are resolved in
ADR,11 which decreases docket congestion.  However, despite high-level
similarities between the broader regimes, there are important differences
between the FAIS Ombud and FINRA arbitrations.  The purpose of this
Note is to explore the financial services ombudsman system in South
Africa and compare it to FINRA’s securities arbitration system in the
United States, highlighting the differences between the two and identifying
potential areas of improvement in the U.S. system.
A. Evaluation Criteria
In evaluating FINRA arbitration and the FAIS Ombud, this Note uses
four criteria to compare the two systems: (1) efficiency, (2) accessibility,
(3) procedural fairness, and (4) substantive rules.  The efficiency criterion
looks at whether a particular feature of the South African or U.S. ADR sys-
tem tends to promote a quick disposition of a matter.  The accessibility
criterion looks at how easily a client with a financial services dispute can
gain access to the ADR venue.  The procedural fairness criterion looks at
whether there is a risk of either party being abused as a result of a particu-
lar procedural mechanism or lack thereof.  The substantive rules criterion
looks at whether there are substantial differences between the substantive
rights afforded to clients in the U.S. and South African ADR systems.  In
particular, this Note considers a client’s right of action for unsuitability,
6. See infra text accompanying notes 19– 24. R
7. See FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 1; David S. Ruder, Foreword to R
NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASKFORCE REPORT— A REPORT CARD
1 (2007).
8. See Daleen Millard, Bespoke Justice?  On Financial Ombudsmen, Rules and Princi-
pals, 44 DE JURE 232, 236– 37 (2011). It’s worth noting that FINRA also has an
ombudsman.  However, the role of the FINRA Ombudsman is very different from the
FAIS Ombud. See Office of the Ombudsman, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/
Ombudsman/ (last updated Sept. 16, 2013).
9. In the U.S., arbitration awards can be entered as a judgment in court. See FIN.
INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure [hereinafter Code of Procedure]
for Customer Disputes R. 12904, in FINRA MANUAL (2013) [hereinafter FINRA MANUAL],
available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&
element_id=1&record_id=1. In South Africa, the FAIS Ombud’s determination has the
same effect as a judgment in a civil court. See Financial Advisory and Intermediary
Services Act 37 of 2002 § 28(5) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter FAIS Act].
10. See JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 1:2 (3d ed. 2013) (listing
the benefits of ADR).
11. C.f. id. § 6:21.
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unauthorized trading, misrepresentation, and negligent rendering of a
financial service as well as the remedies available to claimants.
B. Findings
After applying these four criteria, this Note finds that, despite different
methods of promulgating rules, the substantive rights given to claimants in
both systems are generally similar.  However, the FINRA system holds bro-
kers to a slightly lower standard regarding misrepresentations, and its arbi-
tration panels are more limited in their ability to provide injunctive relief.12
Further, several features of the FAIS Ombud system encourage more effi-
cient and procedurally fair outcomes.13  In particular, the FAIS Ombud’s
adjudicator qualifications, pre-filing requirement, summary disposition
mechanism, and appeals process all suggest possible improvements to the
FINRA system.
C. Overview
This Note begins in Part I by looking at the institutional backgrounds
of the two ADR systems, including the broader regulatory regimes in South
Africa and the United States.  Part II analyzes and compares the jurisdic-
tion of FINRA and the FAIS Ombud.  Part III compares some of the sub-
stantive rights of clients under each system.  Part IV looks at the procedural
aspects of the FAIS Ombud and FINRA arbitration.  Lastly, Part V reviews
the comparisons made in Parts I through IV and, based on the beneficial
features of the FAIS Ombud system, suggests changes to the FINRA system.
I. Institutional Background
A. South Africa
In South Africa, Financial Services Providers (FSPs) are defined by the
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act as “any person,
other than a representative, who as a regular feature of the business of such
person . . . furnishes [financial] advice; or . . . renders an intermediary
service.”14  An intermediary service, in turn, includes facilitating the buy-
12. See infra notes 128– 132 and accompanying text; infra notes 140– 143 and R
accompanying text.
13. It’s important to note that this evaluation only concerns the quality of the fea-
tures of the system, not the actual results.  This Note is not intended to be an empirical
exercise.  Rather, it focuses on comparing whether the features of each system will tend
to lead to greater efficiency, accessibility, and procedurally fair outcomes.  The actual
results would be the subject of future studies.
14. See FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 1.  Person, for the purposes of the Act, means any R
natural person, partnership, trust, or corporation. Id.  Representatives are defined as
“any person . . . who renders a financial service to a client for or on behalf of a financial
services provider,” except for those who render clerical, technical or administrative ser-
vices that do not require judgment. See id. Thus, in one possible arrangement (and
probably the typical one), the FSP would be a financial services company, and its repre-
sentative would be an employee who is actually working with the client.
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ing or selling of financial products.15  By law, FSPs and their representa-
tives must adhere to the General Code of Conduct for Authorized Financial
Services Providers and Representatives (FAIS Code),16 which sets out their
duties when providing financial services.17  Also, FSPs— but not their rep-
resentatives— must be licensed with the Financial Services Board.18
The Financial Services Board Act of 1990 created the Financial Ser-
vices Board (FSB), which is responsible for regulating FSPs and their repre-
sentatives.19  The FSB is governed by eleven members,20 all of whom are
appointed by the South African Minister of Finance21 and may be removed
by the minister, when “in [his or her] opinion[,] . . . sufficient reasons exist
therefor.”22  The authority of the FSB is broad and, in addition to regulat-
ing FSPs, includes the supervision of friendly societies, retirement funds,
insurance companies and collective investment schemes.23
Beneath the FSB falls the Office of the Ombud for Financial Services
Providers, which was created by the FAIS Act of 2002.24  The head of the
Office is the FAIS Ombud, whose job is to resolve disputes between clients
and FSPs or their representatives.25  The Ombud is appointed by the FSB
and must be a person who is “qualified in law and who possesses adequate
knowledge of the rendering of financial services.”26  FAIS Act states the
objective of the Ombud:
The objective of the Ombud is to consider and dispose of complaints in a
procedurally fair, informal, economical and expeditious manner and by ref-
erence to what is equitable in all the circumstances, with due regard to (a)
the contractual arrangement or other legal relationship between the com-
plainant and any other party to the complaint; and (b) the provisions of [the
15. Id. (“any act . . . performed by a person for or on behalf of a client . . . the result
of which is that a client may enter into . . . any transaction in respect of a financial
product with a product supplier; or with a view to buying, selling or otherwise dealing in
(whether on a discretionary or non-discretionary basis), managing, administering, keep-
ing in safe custody, maintaining or servicing a financial product purchased by a client
from a product supplier . . . .”).
16. See id. § 13(2)(b).
17. See General Code of Conduct for Authorized Financial Services Providers and
Representatives [hereinafter FAIS Code], 25299 Gov. Gazette at 20 (Aug. 8, 2003) (S.
Afr.), available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=64687.
18. FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 7(1).  However, there is an important group of profes-
sionals who are exempt from this and every other requirement of the FAIS Act.  The Act
does not apply to persons who are authorized under the Financial Markets Act of 2012
to provide securities services, including brokers who are registered with a stock
exchange. See id. § 45(1).  This will be important in Part II that compares the jurisdic-
tions of the two systems.
19. See Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 § 2 (S. Afr.).
20. See Board Members, FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD, https://www.fsb.co.za/aboutUs/
Pages/board.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
21. Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 § 4(1) (S. Afr.).
22. Id. § 6(2).
23. See id. § 3 (“The functions of the board are to supervise and enforce compliance
with laws regulating financial institutions and the provision of financial services”); id.
§ 1 (defining “financial institution” and “financial service”).
24. See FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 20. R
25. See id. §§ 20– 24.
26. Id. § 21(1)(a).
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FAIS Act].27
The Ombud carries out this objective by hearing complaints from clients,
conducting an investigation, and rendering a binding decision.28  Unlike a
court, the Ombud has more simplified procedures and conducts its hear-
ings in a less formal manner.29  The substantive rules that the Ombud
applies are primarily embodied in the FAIS Code, which is drafted and
published by the registrar of financial service providers,30 who is also the
executive officer of the Financial Service Board.31  However, the Ombud
may also apply other substantive rules including those from the FAIS Act or
the common law.32
B. The United States
In the U.S., any person or company in the business of brokering or
dealing33 securities must be registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).34  The SEC, which is a rough analogue to the FSB, was
founded as part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and is in charge of
enforcing federal securities laws in the U.S.35  The SEC regulates a variety
of securities-related actors, including issuers, underwriters, broker-dealers,
mutual funds, and investment advisors.36  The SEC is empowered to make
27. Id. § 20(3).
28. See generally infra notes 155– 216 and accompanying text (describing how the R
Ombud hears and resolves disputes).
29. See FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 20(3). R
30. Id. § 15.
31. Id. § 2.
32. See id. § 40.
33. A broker is defined as “any person engaged in the business of effecting transac-
tions in securities for the account of others,” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(4) (2012), while a dealer is
defined as “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities . . . for
such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.” Id. § 78c(5).  While the
Exchange Act defines the two terms differently, most rules do not distinguish between
the two.  Robert L.D. Colby & Lanny A. Schwartz, What Is a Broker-Dealer, in BROKER-
DEALER REGULATION 2– 4 n.1 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2d. ed. 2012).  “Broker-dealer” will
be used for the remainder of this Note unless there’s a need to distinguish between the
two.
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1).  An “associated person of a broker or dealer,” such as
a brokerage firm’s representative, is not required to register. See §§ 78c(18), o(a)(1).
However, representatives generally must register with a self-regulatory organization, like
FINRA. See NASD R. 1031, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 9. R
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a).  Some of the laws that the SEC is in charge of enforcing
include the Securities Act of 1933 (dealing with issuing of securities), the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (dealing with the exchange of securities), the Trust Indenture Act
of 1939 (dealing with debt financings of public companies), the Investment Company
Act of 1940 (dealing with the regulation of mutual funds), and the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 (dealing with the registration and regulation of investment advisors).
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 1 (3rd ed. 2011).  In addition to the SEC,
different state agencies and statutes also regulate the securities industry.  State laws that
relate to the issuance, sale or trading of securities are referred to as “blue sky” laws. Id.
at 24.  The jurisdiction of state securities commissions in charge of enforcing “blue sky”
laws, however, has been substantially diminished by the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act, which preempts a significant portion of state securities regulations.
Id.
36. See id. at 1– 2.
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binding rules to regulate the securities industry, so long as the rules are
carried out in accordance with the authorizing statutes.37
While the SEC has the authority to regulate broker-dealers, self-regula-
tory organizations (SROs) like FINRA oversee a large portion of the securi-
ties industry.38  SROs are non-governmental organizations that regulate
the financial services industry through rules and procedures that the SEC
reviews and approves.39  Broker-dealers, in addition to registering with the
SEC, must be a member of an SRO,40 typically FINRA.41  Representatives
of broker-dealers must also register with FINRA.42
The FINRA board of governors, which is the highest body within
FINRA, is in charge of approving the rules that FINRA promulgates.43
FINRA’s board of governors consists of the CEO of FINRA and a mix of
public and industry governors who are elected by FINRA’s member
firms.44  None of the governors are appointed by a government official.45
Among the twenty-two current governors on the FINRA board, ten are
industry governors,46 meaning they represent the interests and expertise of
the financial services industry.47
In addition to its regulatory function, FINRA also provides arbitration
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at 5, 154. FINRA is the product of the merger of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange’s regulatory arm in 2007.
Today, FINRA handles the former self-regulatory functions of the NASD and the New
York Stock Exchange. See id. at 154.
39. SROs like FINRA have been empowered to regulate this way through the Maloney
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3.  However, all SROs must register with the SEC and be subject
to the SEC’s oversight. See id. For an overview of the rulemaking process, see Fin. Indus.
Reg. Auth., FINRA Rulemaking Process, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/%20Industry/Reg-
ulation/FINRARules/RulemakingProcess/ (last accessed Oct. 12, 2013) [hereinafter
FINRA Rulemaking Process].
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (“It shall be unlawful for any registered broker or
dealer to effect any transaction in, or induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of,
any security . . . unless such broker or dealer is a member of a [registered] securities
association.”).  FINRA is a registered securities association.
41. BROKER-DEALER & INV. MGMT. REG. GRP., PROSKAUER ROSE LLP, BROKER-DEALER
REGISTRATION AND FINRA MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION 2 (2011), available at http://
www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/broker-dealer/Broker-Dealer-Registration-FINRA-
Membership-App.pdf.
42. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Selecting Investment Professionals, FINRA, http://www.
finra.org/Investors/SmartInvesting/GettingStarted/SelectingInvestmentProfessional/
P117278 (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
43. See FINRA Rulemaking Process, supra note 39. R
44. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., FINRA Board of Governors, FINRA, http://
www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/Leadership/P009756 (last updated Aug. 6, 2013) [herein-
after FINRA Board of Governors]; By-Laws of the Corporation Art. III sec. 4, in FINRA
MANUAL, supra note 9. R
45. See By-Laws of the Corporation Art. III sec. 4, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 9. R
46. See FINRA Board of Governors, supra note 44. R
47. For example, Gregory Fleming, who sits on the FINRA board, is the current Exec-
utive Vice President, President of Asset Management, and President of the Global Wealth
Management group at Morgan Stanley.  Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21
(2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000119312511
050049/d10k.htm.
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services through its arbitration arm48— FINRA Dispute Resolution— which
is a subsidiary of FINRA.49  FINRA Dispute Resolution’s primary purpose
is to help resolve securities-related disputes between clients and broker-
dealers or their representatives.50  FINRA arbitration is less formal than
traditional litigation and uses simplified procedures.51  Through a strike
and rank system, parties select a panel of one or three neutral arbitrators,
who make the final arbitration decision.52
All arbitrators on a panel are categorized as either public or non-pub-
lic.  Non-public arbitrators must have some background in the securities
industry, while public arbitrators only need five years of business or pro-
fessional experience and at least two years of college-level credits.53  None
of the panelists except for the chairperson needs to have a legal back-
ground.54  FINRA generates a random list of arbitrators through its Neutral
List Selection System,55 and each party has the opportunity to strike a
number of arbitrators from the list and rank the remaining in the order of
their preference.56  From these rankings, the arbitration panel is chosen.
C. Comparison
The financial services regulatory regimes of South Africa and the U.S.
are similar in that both regimes contain an ADR avenue for disputes
48. By contrast, the SEC cannot adjudicate disputes between private parties. See
HAZEN, supra note 35, at 4. However, even without FINRA, private parties would always R
have the option of bringing an action under the federal securities laws in state or federal
court.
49. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 10-32: DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY-LAWS
(2010), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/
documents/notices/p121697.pdf.
50. See id. at 1.  In addition to arbitration between clients and broker-dealers, FINRA
also handles employment disputes between broker-dealers and their representatives and
business disputes between broker-dealer firms. See Code of Procedure for Industry Dis-
putes R. 13200, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 9. R
51. For example, FINRA has a simplified discovery process in which both parties are
given a list of documents that are presumptively discoverable. See Code of Procedure for
Customer Disputes R. 12506, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 9 (“Document Production R
Lists 1 and 2 describe the documents that are presumed to be discoverable in all arbitra-
tions between a customer and a member or associated person.”); see also FIN. INDUS. REG.
AUTH., DISCOVERY GUIDE 3 (2011) [hereinafter DISCOVERY GUIDE], available at http://
www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/@arbtors/documents/
arbmed/p123494.pdf.
52. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12400(a), in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
53. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA’s Arbitrators, FINRA (Jan. 19, 2013), http://www.
finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitrators/BecomeanArbitrator/FINRAArbitrators/
index.htm [hereinafter FINRA’s Arbitrators].
54. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12400, in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9.  In fact, in some cases, the chairperson does not need to have a law degree if he R
or she has previously served as an arbitrator on three arbitrations administered by an
SRO. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12402, 12403, in FINRA MANUAL,
supra note 9. R
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between clients and financial advisors.57  However, the American and
South African regimes differ in a number of important ways. The first is
that FINRA, an SRO, runs the securities ADR system in the U.S. One of the
underlying reasons for the SRO model is that the cost of financial services
regulation is largely borne by the industry itself, rather than taxpayers.58
In addition, the SRO model promises a better balance between beneficial
regulation and market efficiency because the rule makers are also members
of the financial services industry.59  Financial services professionals, who
are free from political influence and experienced in the industry, are
thought to be in the best position to know which rules will be effective and
which will be overly burdensome.60
The FAIS Ombud system takes a very different approach.  The rule
maker in South Africa— the Registrar of Financial Services providers—
enjoys relatively little autonomy from the political landscape because he
was appointed and can be removed by the Minister of Finance.61  Further,
the Financial Services Board Act explicitly discourages appointing a Regis-
trar who is actually engaged in the financial services industry.  The Act
sets up a presumption of ineligibility for industry members that can only
be overcome by the Minister conducting his due diligence with the relevant
association or organization that such industry member is engaged in.62
But does this mean that the U.S. model will tend to produce better
substantive rules?  Not necessarily.  As a preliminary matter, FINRA rule
makers are not completely autonomous.  They must have all their rule pro-
posals approved by the SEC.63  Further, even if they were completely free
from government interference, the SRO system doesn’t come without risks.
While the SRO system promises a better balance between regulation and
efficiency, allowing the industry to regulate itself can lead to setting a lower
standard for financial services professionals.64
57. By “financial advisor,” the author means broker-dealers and their representatives
in the U.S., and FSPs and their representatives in South Africa.
58. Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities
Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C.L. REV. 475
(1984).
59. Id.
60. Cf. id.
61. See Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 §§ 4, 6 (S. Afr.).
62. Id. § 5 (“No person shall be appointed as a member or an alternate member of
the board . . . if, in the opinion of the Minister, he or she is actually engaged in the
business of a financial institution or actually engaged in the rendering of a financial
service: Provided that the Minister may, in consultation with the recognised association
or organisation of the relevant financial institution or financial service in which such
person is actually engaged, appoint a person who would otherwise be disqualified in
terms of this paragraph from being a member of the board”).  Since the Registrar is a
member of the FSB, this standard applies to him.
63. See FINRA Rulemaking Process, supra note 39. R
64. See Smythe, supra note 58, at 476.  Whether the SRO model is beneficial overall R
is outside the scope of this Note, but for a great discussion on the matter, see generally
Panel Discussion: Crisis in Confidence-Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 10 FORD-
HAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 175– 201 (2005).
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In any case, it appears that the difference between the government and
SRO rulemaking bodies has not— at least yet— translated into any serious
differences between the substantive rules that the U.S. and South Africa
have chosen to govern broker-dealers and FSPs, respectively.  As we will see
in Part III, the substantive rights of clients regarding suitability, unautho-
rized trading, and negligence are very similar in both systems.65  And while
there is a difference between the systems’ rules on misrepresentation, the
difference is only significant in a limited range of circumstances.66  Thus,
in the financial services ADR context, it is not clear whether the U.S. or
South African model will tend to produce better substantive rules.
Another difference is the selection and qualification of adjudicators.
In South Africa, the FSB appoints the Ombud, who must be someone
“qualified in law and who possesses adequate knowledge of the rendering
of financial services.”67  Once appointed, the Ombud is the sole adjudica-
tor for cases brought before her and may only be removed by the FSB for
good cause.68  In this way, the Ombud serves a role closer to that of a
traditional judge than an arbitrator.  Under the FINRA system, a different
panel of arbitrators is chosen for each dispute through the strike and rank
system,69 and only the chairperson of the panel must be an attorney.70
Arbitrators are not required to have any understanding of the law, and their
failure to have such an understanding is generally not grounds for over-
turning an arbitrator’s decision.71  Moreover, public arbitrators are not
even required to have experience in the securities industry.72
The advantage of the South African system is that adjudicators are less
likely to be under qualified or uninformed.73  Contrary to FINRA arbitra-
tors, the Ombud is required to have a legal background and benefits from
65. See infra notes 144– 153 and accompanying text. R
66. See id.
67. FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 21(a). The FSB can also appoint one or more deputy
ombuds.  For an interesting article on Noluntu Bam, a current Deputy Ombud, see
Bruce Cameron, Bam Gives You a Fair Deal, PERSONAL FINANCE (July 20, 2012, 8:40 PM),
http://www.iol.co.za/business/personal-finance/financial-planning/financial/bam-
gives-you-a-fair-deal-1.1343455#.UKv3pmeraSo.
68. FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 21(4). R
69. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12400(a), in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
70. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12400(c), in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
71. See Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that “a court
reviewing an arbitral award cannot presume that the arbitrator is capable of understand-
ing and applying legal principles with the sophistication of a highly skilled attorney.
Indeed, this is so far from being the case that an arbitrator ‘under the test of manifest
disregard is ordinarily assumed to be a blank slate unless educated in the law by the
parties.’ ”).
72. See FINRA’s Arbitrators, supra note 53. R
73. For clarity, this is not to say that FINRA arbitrators, as an empirical matter, are
underqualified in any respect or are less qualified than the Ombud.  Rather, this Note
argues that because the minimum qualification requirements for FINRA arbitrators, par-
ticularly public arbitrators, are lower than those of the Ombud regarding their legal and
securities experience, there is a greater risk of FINRA arbitrators making an uninformed
decision.
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hearing many (if not most) of the financial services disputes that are heard
through her office.  The Ombud will thus likely be in a better position to
render decisions that are in-line with the current state of the law.
One drawback is that the Ombud is less likely to be neutral and inde-
pendent as compared to a FINRA arbitrator.  This is true for two reasons.
First, because the FSB is authorized to appoint and remove the Ombud,74
there is a possibility that the agenda of the FSB and the Minister will influ-
ence the Ombud’s decisions.  Second, unlike in the FINRA system, the
Ombud lacks a negative feedback mechanism that promotes neutrality.75
In the FINRA system, the selection process encourages neutrality among
arbitrators by allowing parties to strike arbitrators that they view as
biased.76  Thus, if an arbitrator has a long history of always (or never)
granting awards in favor of the claimant, they are likely to be struck by the
respondents (or claimants).77  The Ombud has no such feedback mecha-
nism from the parties.  Therefore, in terms of adjudicator selection, the
South African system provides fewer procedural safeguards for the parties
than the FINRA system.
II. Jurisdiction
A. South Africa
The jurisdiction of the FAIS Ombud is broad.  Indeed, the cases
brought before the FAIS Ombud involve everything from stocks78 to real
estate syndication,79 and even car insurance.80  According to the statute,
the FAIS Omud may hear all complaints that
relat[e] to a financial service rendered by a financial services provider or
representative to the complainant . . . in which . . . the provider or represen-
tative –  (a) has contravened or failed to comply with a provision of [the FAIS]
Act and that as a result thereof the complainant has suffered or is likely to
suffer financial prejudice or damage; (b) has wilfully or negligently rendered
a financial service to the complainant which has caused prejudice or dam-
age to the complainant or which is likely to result in such prejudice or dam-
age; or (c) has treated the complainant unfairly.81
74. See FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 21.  The FSB members are, in turn, appointed by the R
Minister of Finance.  See Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 § 4 (S. Afr.).
75. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12403, in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
76. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12400(a), in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
77. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12406, in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9 (“[A]ny party may ask an arbitrator to recuse himself or herself from the panel for R
good cause.”); see also Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12407, in FINRA MAN-
UAL, supra note 9 (allowing a director to remove an arbitrator). R
78. See e.g., Meyer v. Van Der Merwe, FOC 4566/06-07/UN1 (March 31, 2010) (S.
Afr.), available at http://www.faisombud.co.za/library/meyer_04566.pdf.
79. See, e.g., Kapp v. Wanadoo, FAIS 05639/10-11/WC1 (April 11, 2012) (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.faisombud.co.za/library/kapp_05369.pdf.
80. See e.g., Mojela v. Estene Brokers, FAIS 00150/08-09/GP/3 (May 14, 2012) (S.
Afr.).
81. See FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 1. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-1\CIN105.txt unknown Seq: 12  3-JUN-14 15:34
156 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
Within this broad mandate, the FAIS Ombud generally has the authority to
hear any financial services claim arising from a violation of the FAIS Act,
the FAIS Code or any common law duty that pre-existed the FAIS Act,82 so
long as the claim does not fall within the jurisdiction of another Ombud.83
However, there are some restrictions on the jurisdiction of the FAIS
Ombud.  Most importantly, the Ombud cannot hear any complaint against
a securities broker who is an authorised user of a licensed stock
exchange— which would include, for example, all the brokers on the Johan-
nesburg Stock Exchange— if the complaint relates to a securities transac-
tion.84 Further, the Ombud may not hear complaints on behalf of the
general public; complainants must be individuals or a group of individu-
als.85  Lastly, the Ombud may not investigate any complaints which consti-
tute a monetary claim in excess of 800,000 South African rand (just over
$73,000), unless the responding party has agreed to exceed this limit in
writing.86
B. United States
In the U.S., courts strongly favor arbitration, and the jurisdiction of
arbitration panels is accordingly broad.  Arbitration panels are granted
authority through the Federal Arbitration Act.87  Under the Act, any “writ-
ten provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforcea-
ble . . . .”88  The Supreme Court has held that arbitration agreements
82. This is because FAIS Act does not change or supersede the common law. See id.
§ 40; Millard, supra note 8, at 237. R
83. Since the creation of the FAIS Ombud, the South African parliament has enacted
legislation that establishes a council to consider, grant, or refuse other financial services
ombud schemes.  Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act 37 of 2004 §§ 2, 8 (S. Afr.).
However, the jurisdiction of new ombuds is limited to specific areas and participants
within the financial services realm. See id. § 13.  Where jurisdiction is unclear as
between two competing financial services ombuds, the FAIS Ombud has exclusive juris-
diction. See id. § 13(3)(b).
84. FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 45(1) (“The provisions of this Act do not apply to the R
rendering of financial services by any ‘authorised user’ . . . as defined in section 1 of the
Financial Markets Act, 2012 that is authorised by that Act to render those financial
services.”); Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 § 1 (S. Afr.) (defining “authorised user” as
someone who is authorized by a licensed exchange and involved in the business of buy-
ing or selling securities or rendering advice in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities).
85. See FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 1 (defining “complainant” as “a specific client who R
submits a complaint to the ombud.”); About FAIS Ombud, FAIS OMBUD, http://
www.faisombud.co.za/about (“‘Client’ means a specific person or group of persons,
excluding the general public . . . .”) (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
86. Rules on Proceedings of the Office of the Ombud for Financial Services Provid-
ers Notice 81 of 2003 § 4(c) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter FAIS Rules on Proceedings].
87. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1– 2 (2012).
88. Id. § 1.
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involving securities disputes are equally binding.89
The arbitration agreement signed by the parties establishes the scope
of an arbitration panel’s jurisdiction,90 which can include federal and state
securities law claims as well as claims based on FINRA rules and common
law fiduciary duties.91  If there is a conflict between a state’s blue sky laws
and the Federal Arbitration Act— for example where state law would not
allow the state cause of action to go to arbitration— the Arbitration Act will
prevail, and the state claims will go to arbitration instead of court.92
Even if parties agree to arbitrate in the FINRA forum, the type of dis-
pute that can be heard must be in accordance with FINRA rules.  Under
FINRA rules, parties must arbitrate where: (1) the dispute “arose in connec-
tion with the business activities of the [FINRA] member or associated per-
son;” (2) it involves a client and a FINRA member; and (3) either FINRA
arbitration is required by a written agreement or is requested by the cli-
ent.93  Thus, it is not necessary that the parties agreed to submit to arbitra-
tion before the dispute arose.  A client can force a FINRA member or its
representative into arbitration without the member having ever agreed to
arbitrate.94  Failure to submit to a client’s request to arbitrate where the
FINRA rules require it constitutes a violation of FINRA’s code of arbitra-
tion, which could result in disciplinary action against the member.95
In addition to FINRA’s jurisdiction over client complaints, it also has
jurisdiction over disputes between industry members.96  Under FINRA
rules, an intra-industry dispute generally must be arbitrated if it relates to
the business activities of a member or associated person and is between or
among members, members and associates, or associates.97  This would
include a dispute between broker-dealer firms, or between a broker-dealer
and its employee.
However, there are limitations on cases that a FINRA arbitration panel
may hear.  This is because FINRA limits the scope of claims that it allows
89. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding
that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are enforceable for securities disputes, despite
the limitation imposed by federal securities statutes).
90. See Sigma v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 704 (2d. Cir. 1985) (“An
arbitration panel derives its jurisdiction from an agreement of the parties.”).
91. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 15.1[1]– [4] (West 2013).
92. Id.
93. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12200, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note
9.  Parties may but are not required to arbitrate a dispute if the first two requirements are R
met and both parties subsequently agree in writing to submit the dispute to the arbitra-
tion panel. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12201, in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
94. See id.
95. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12000, in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
96. See Code of Procedure for Industry Dispute R. 13200, in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
97. Id. However, arbitration between industry members is not mandatory in dis-
putes involving sexual harassment, discrimination or whistleblower statutes. Code of
Procedure for Industry Dispute R. 13201, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 9. R
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panels to entertain. Most importantly, FINRA panels can only hear claims
involving a FINRA member.98  Also, even where all the requirements for
permissive arbitration are met, parties may not arbitrate a dispute if the
dispute involves the insurance business activities of a member that is also
an insurance company.99  Lastly, FINRA panels cannot hear shareholder
derivative suits or class actions.100
C. Comparison
The jurisdictions of both the FAIS Ombud and FINRA arbitration
panels are both relatively broad.  However, they differ significantly in the
types of financial services claims they can hear.  In South Africa, the
Ombud cannot hear claims involving securities transactions by authorized
users of licensed exchanges101 while, in the U.S., FINRA can only hear
claims against FINRA members.102  This means that the accessibility of
each ADR system is largely dependent on the type of financial service pro-
vided.  For example, an investment advisor in the U.S. can render advice
relating to the purchase of securities and would not be subject to FINRA
arbitration, so long as he or she does not actually broker the sale and thus
is not a FINRA member.103  Rendering that same advice in South Africa
would give the Ombud jurisdiction.  Conversely, if someone in the U.S.
brokers the sale of securities, she must be a FINRA member and, in turn,
subject to FINRA’s jurisdiction.  The same is not true with respect to the
Ombud’s jurisdiction, if the broker is an authorized user of a licensed
exchange.  This difference can be further complicated where insurance is
thrown into the mix.  In the U.S., a salesperson can broker the sale of an
insurance product or render advice in connection with that sale while
avoiding FINRA’s membership and jurisdiction.104  These same financial
services would fall within the Ombud’s purview in South Africa.
What does all of this mean in terms of the accessibility criterion?
While there are some circumstances in which the two systems overlap,105
each system gives greater access to the venue depending on the financial
service.  The Ombud provides greater access for clients with insurance dis-
putes because, regardless who sold the product, the Ombud can hear the
complaint.  FINRA, on the other hand, provides greater access for clients
98. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12201, in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
99. Id.
100. HAZEN, supra note 91, at § 15.1[11]. R
101. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. R
102. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12201, in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
103. See Suzanne Barlyn, COMPLY-FINRA Reignites Efforts to Oversee Investment
Advisers, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/21/finra-
advisers-comply-idUSL1E8MK60H20121121.  However, investment advisors must regis-
ter with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. 82b-3 (2012).
104. This is because insurance products are not necessarily considered “securities”
under federal law. See HAZEN, supra note 35, at 26.  Thus, insurance brokers are not R
required to be FINRA members.
105. One example would be a broker involved in the sale of unlisted securities.
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with securities disputes because, whether the securities are listed or not,
whoever brokered the transaction must have been a FINRA member.
Another difference is the source of their jurisdictions.  While the
Ombud derives its jurisdiction directly from the FAIS Act, FINRA jurisdic-
tion is established through a combination of the Federal Arbitration Act
and the arbitration agreement.106  Because of the additional requirement of
an arbitration agreement, it might appear that FINRA arbitration is a less
accessible venue than the FAIS Ombud.  However, for two reasons, this
likely is not the case. First, broker-dealers in the U.S. almost uniformly
require their clients to sign an arbitration agreement before opening an
account.107  Second, even if a client does not have an arbitration agree-
ment, FINRA rules require members to submit to arbitration if the require-
ments of permissive arbitration are met and the client wants to arbitrate.108
Thus, it is unlikely that a client desiring the FINRA venue will be denied for
lack of an arbitration agreement.
However, the claimant cannot have it both ways.  The Federal Arbitra-
tion Act makes pre-dispute arbitration agreements enforceable against all
parties.109  This means a client who wants to resort to the courts after sign-
ing an arbitration agreement will not be able to do so without the blessing
of the respondent.  South Africa, on the contrary, would allow the client to.
Because almost all brokers require clients to sign an arbitration agreement
before opening an account,110 clients in the U.S. are largely denied access
to the courts.
But does mandatory arbitration mean that the FINRA system is less
procedurally fair than the FAIS Ombud system?  It does not.  Under the
South African system, a respondent is denied access to courts if the claim-
ant chooses FAIS Ombud as the venue111— and without the respondent
consenting to it beforehand.  Because procedural fairness is a two-way
street, the claimant’s inability to litigate in the U.S. must be weighed
against the respondent’s inability to do so in South Africa.  Therefore, if
procedural fairness is determined considering both parties’ rights, the out-
come is a wash.
Even putting the cross-country comparison aside, there are a number
of good arguments for why the U.S. system is not procedurally unfair to
claimants.  First, the procedures available in arbitration might be more
claimant-friendly than in litigation.112  If so, denying the claimant access
to the courts would not be a detriment at all.  Second, whether or not arbi-
106. See supra notes 87– 90 and accompanying text. R
107. See Ruder, supra note 7, at 1. R
108. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12200, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note
9. R
109. See 9 U.S.C. § 1– 2.
110. See Ruder, supra note 7, at 1. R
111. See Risk v. Ombud for Fin. Serv. Providers 2012, no. 38791/2011, 1 (HC) at 11
para. 38 (S. Afr.) (declining respondent’s access to court in lieu of ongoing proceeding
before the Ombud).
112. For a discussion of the benefits of arbitration for the claimant, see Jill I. Gross,
The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REV. 1174, 1187– 91 (2010).
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tration clauses are the industry norm, the client still consented to the pro-
cedure and was on notice before the initial transaction.  Third, a client’s
inability to escape a binding arbitration clause may be fair because, as dis-
cussed above, it balances the client’s ability to force their broker into arbi-
tration without an arbitration agreement.  Lastly, as will be discussed in
Part III, claimants have a number of substantive rights in FINRA arbitration
that they do not have in a federal or state court,113 so claimants may benefit
from entering arbitration over litigation.
Considering the foregoing, it is unclear that forced arbitration makes
the FINRA system less procedurally fair than South Africa’s Ombud system.
What is clear, however, is that forced arbitration means that the soundness
of the procedural mechanisms available in FINRA arbitration— discussed in
Part IV— are especially important because the claimant has no alternative.
The final difference is each system’s jurisdiction to hear intra-industry
disputes among those in the financial services industry.  While the FAIS
Act does not specifically mention industry disputes, its language also does
not preclude an FSP from being a complainant, so long as they are a “cli-
ent.”114  According to the text, then, the FAIS Ombud has jurisdiction to
resolve disputes between FSPs.  However, despite the ability to hear such
disputes, there are two limitations on the FAIS Ombud’s jurisdiction when
compared to FINRA.  First, because complainants must be clients, the FAIS
Ombud is unable to hear complaints from employees of FSPs.115  More
importantly, assuming that disputes between FSPs involve larger sums, the
800,000 Rand limitation is likely a barrier for FSPs wanting to use the FAIS
Ombud to resolve disputes.116  Therefore, this barrier limits access to the
Ombud forum where the FINRA system does not.
III. Substantive Duties and Rights
In South Africa and the U.S., the substantive duties of FSPs and bro-
ker-dealers— and the corresponding rights of clients— in the financial ser-
vices ADR systems come from a variety of sources.  In South Africa, these
113. See infra at notes 148– 150 and accompanying text. R
114. FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 1 (defining client as “a specific person or group of R
persons, excluding the general public, who is or may become the subject to whom a
financial service is rendered intentionally”).  Furthermore, there is no requirement that
a claimant be a natural person. See id. See, e.g., Dolphins Creek Golf Estate v. Gericke,
FOC 2246/07-08/WC 1 (May 14, 2012) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.faisombud.co.
za/library/dolphins_creek_golf_estate_02246.pdf.
115. Unless, of course, an employee is also a client of the FSP.
116. Indeed, the dollar figures in FINRA arbitration often far exceed 800,000 rand.
See, e.g., Nate Raymond, Judge Blocks Auction Rate Arbitration Against Citigroup, CHI.
TRIB. (May 6, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-06/business/sns-rt-us-
citigroup-arbitrationbre9450rb-20130506_1_auction-rate-arbitration-finra-financial-
industry-regulatory-authority (“Increasingly large awards began spilling out of FINRA as
a result of the economic meltdown that began in 2008 . . . . The largest during that
period was a $406.6 million award STMicroelectronics NV won in February 2009 in a
case against a unit of Credit Suisse Group AG over auction-rate securities.  By April
2012, the number of arbitrations pending with more than $10 million at stake had hit
around 200 . . . .”).
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rights come from three primary sources: the FAIS Act, the FAIS Code, and
the common law.117  In the U.S., they come primarily from the Exchange
Act, the FINRA Code of Arbitration, and the common law.  In both jurisdic-
tions, if a financial advisor violates a client’s right given by common law,
statute, or the code of conduct, the violation is actionable in the ADR sys-
tem.118  In the U.S., however, the violation of a FINRA Rule is generally not
actionable in court.119
A. Suitability
In South Africa, an FSP or its representative must take reasonable
steps to gather information about a client’s financial situation when ren-
dering advice.120  After this, the FSP is required to conduct an analysis
using the information and identify the products that will be appropriate for
the client’s risk appetite and financial needs.121  However, an FSP or repre-
sentative’s obligation does not stop there.  If the client chooses to enter into
a different transaction than the one recommended, the FSP or its represen-
tative is still required to alert the client to the clear existence of any risk
and to advise the client to “take particular care to consider whether any
product selected is appropriate to the client’s needs.”122
In the United States, the analogue to the FAIS Code’s suitability rule is
FINRA Rule 2111(a), which requires the following:
A member or an associated person must have a reasonable basis to believe
that a recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security
or securities is suitable for the customer, based on the information obtained
through the reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to
ascertain the customer’s investment profile.123
Under the FINRA rule, a client’s investment profile includes the client’s
age, other investments, financial situation, tax status, risk tolerance and
liquidity needs.124  While the FINRA rule is a slightly longer and more
specific, it demands approximately the same duty of FINRA members and
117. The FAIS Act and the FAIS Code are the primary sources of clients’ rights.  How-
ever, they are not the exclusive sources, because the FAIS Act does not change, but rather
adds to clients’ rights under the common law. See FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 40 (“No R
provision of this act . . . may be construed as affecting any right of a client . . . to seek
appropriate legal redress in terms of the common law or any other statutory law.”).
118. See FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 20(3); Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. R
12201, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 9. R
119. See HAZEN, supra note 35, at 153 (“the overwhelming majority of cases have R
denied the existence of a private remedy by an injured investor based solely on the
violation of an applicable rule of a self-regulatory organization.”). See e.g., In re VeriFone
Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993) (“It is well established that violation of an
exchange rule will not support a private claim.”).
120. See FAIS Code, supra note 17, § 8(1)(a). R
121. Id. § 8(1)(b– c). See e.g., Ramdass v. Standard Bank Fin. Consultancy, FOC 882/
05/KZN/(1), at 18 (Oct. 20, 2005) (S. Afr.) (applying suitability analysis to FSP who
sold an illiquid asset to a client who needed funds to purchase a property).
122. FAIS Code, supra note 17, § 8(4)(b). R
123. Duties and Conflicts R. 2111(a), in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 9. R
124. Id.
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their representatives: they must sufficiently understand the needs of the
client when recommending investments.
B. Unauthorized Trading
In South Africa, when purchasing or selling a financial product on
behalf of a client, an FSP must do so “in accordance with the contractual
relationship and reasonable requests or instructions of the client, which
must be executed as soon as reasonably possible . . . .”125  Unless the FSP
has been given explicit authorization to exercise discretion in selling or
purchasing products— something known as a discretionary account— the
FSP must have authorization for each particular trade; failure to do so
would be a violation of the FAIS Code and actionable before the
Ombud.126  FINRA Rules similarly state that “[n]o member or registered
representative shall exercise any discretionary power in a customer’s
account unless such customer has given prior written authorization to a
stated individual or individuals . . . .”127  Thus, both ADR systems provide
similar rules against unauthorized trading and require explicit authoriza-
tion for discretionary accounts.
C. Misrepresentation
In South Africa, an FSP is under a specific duty to ensure that all infor-
mation provided to a client is factually correct when rendering a financial
service.128  Further, any information also must be provided in plain lan-
guage that avoids uncertainty and confusion, and it must not be mislead-
ing.129  However, in order for the misrepresentation to establish liability,
the misrepresentation must have caused the financial prejudice suffered by
the client, and it must be material in that the investor relied on it in making
his or her decision.130  This approach means that, even if an FSP or its
representative was reasonably diligent— not negligent— in presenting infor-
mation to a client, liability will be incurred if the client relies on the infor-
mation and, as a result, incurs a loss.
In contrast to the requirements of the FAIS Code, the FINRA rule on
misrepresentations sets a slightly lower bar for FSPs.  FINRA Rule 2020
125. FAIS Code, supra note 17, § 3(1)(d). R
126. See Ludewig v. Van Der Merwe, FOC 661/05/GP/(1), at 8 (March 20, 2007) (S.
Afr.), available at http://www.faisombud.co.za/library/ludewig_00661.pdf (“[P]roviders
are required to obtain authorisation in order to render financial services in respect of
particular financial products.  It is against the FAIS Act for providers to render financial
services in respect of a product for which the provider is not authorised, even if the
provider believes that he has the necessary skill and expertise in respect of the
product.”).
127. Business Conduct R. 2510, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 9. R
128. FAIS Code, supra note 17, § 3(1)(a)(i) (“When a provider renders a financial R
service representations made and information provided to a client by the provider must
be factually correct.”). See e.g., Ludewig, FOC 661/05/GP/(1), at 8.
129. Id. § 3(1)(a)(ii).
130. See Ramdass, FOC 882/05/KZN/(1), at 16 (“[T]here must be a nexus between
the false statement and the resultant contract in order to allow redress on the basis of the
misrepresentation.”).
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states, “[n]o member shall effect any transaction in, or induce the purchase
or sale of, any security by means of any manipulative, deceptive or other
fraudulent device or contrivance.”131  FINRA has found this rule to be vio-
lated only where the broker presented information in at least a reckless
fashion.132  However, the rule does not mandate that all the information
provided to the client be true or that it be plainly intelligible.  So long as the
broker-dealer or its representative does not act recklessly in providing
information in connection with a transaction, he or she cannot be held
liable under FINRA Rule 2020.
D. Negligent Rendering of a Financial Service
In South Africa, an FSP’s duty of care is rooted in both the FAIS Code
and the common law.  Under the FAIS Code, the FSP is held to a general
duty of care and loyalty: “[a] provider must at all times render financial
services honestly, fairly, with due skill, care and diligence, and in the inter-
ests of clients and the integrity of the financial services industry.”133  In
addition to this statutory duty, an FSP also has duties under the common
law such that an FSP’s willful or negligent failure to act with reasonable
care and skill and in good faith is actionable, if such failure leads to finan-
cial damages.134  If it is shown that an FSP acted in a negligent manner or
in a manner inconsistent with the FAIS Act or the FAIS Code, it is not a
defense to say that the client allowed him to do so.  An FSP cannot request
or induce a client to waive any right or benefit conferred on the client by
the FAIS Code, and cannot rightly accept or act on any such waiver; any
such waiver is null and void.135
In the United States, there is no FINRA rule explicitly addressing negli-
gence.  However, negligent behavior constitutes a breach of FINRA Rule
2010.136  Also, broker-dealers and their representatives are subject to state-
based common law duties to exercise due care in connection with the cli-
131. Duties and Conflicts R. 2020, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 9. R
132. See Dep’t of Enforcement v. Manaia, No. 2009018818101 (FINRA Discip. Proc.
June 28, 2013), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/documents/
ohodecisions/p325357.pdf (holding that NASD Rule 2120 was not violated by negligent
conduct); Dep’t of Enforcement v. Golub, No. C10990024, 2000 NASD Discip. LEXIS 14
at *8 (Nov. 17, 2000) (“[W]e find that [the respondent] acted at a minimum recklessly
in making the misrepresentations, and we affirm the Hearing Panel’s finding that he
violated . . . [NASD] Conduct Rule 2120.”).  NASD Rule 2120 has since been converted
to FINRA Rule 2020. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Rule Conversion Charts, FINRA, http://
www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/FINRARules/p085560 (last updated Dec. 13,
2012).
133. FAIS Code, supra note 17, § 2. R
134. See Millard, supra note 8, at 237. R
135. FAIS Code, supra note 17, § 21. R
136. See Duties and Conflicts R. 2010, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 9 (“A member, in R
the conduct of its business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just
and equitable principles of trade.”); Manaia, No. 2009018818101, at 5 (“In this case, the
evidence establishes that . . . [the broker] . . . acted negligently and violated the standard
of care imposed upon him by NASD Rule 2110 and FINRA Rule 2010.”).
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ent’s account.137  Breach of that duty constitutes negligence, which is
actionable before a FINRA arbitration panel if damages result.138  Finally,
like in South Africa, broker-dealers and their representatives cannot con-
tract with clients to avoid compliance with federal and SRO rules.139
E. Remedies Available
In South Africa, the FAIS Ombud is empowered to make any award or
order that a court could make, including damages or an injunction.140
FINRA arbitration panels, on the other hand, are more limited in their abil-
ity to order injunctions.  While FINRA rules allow for the granting of a
permanent injunction in the case of a dispute between industry mem-
bers,141 they do not allow so for the granting of a temporary injunction.142
Moreover, injunctive relief is not available at all in customer disputes.143
F. Comparison of Substantive Rights
On the whole, a client’s substantive rights with respect to suitability,
unauthorized trading and negligence are similar under both the U.S. and
South African systems.  However, there is a difference regarding the rules of
misrepresentation.  In the U.S., a broker-dealer or representative would
only violate the FINRA rule when he or she acted recklessly in conveying
137. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient?  Principles,
Rules, and Fiduciary Duties, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 710, 736.
138. See HAZEN, supra note 91, § 15.1[4] (“[S]tate common law claims remained sub- R
ject to arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act.”).  Indeed, in 2012,
1941 cases in FINRA arbitration involved a negligence claim.  Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth.,
Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/
FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/ (last updated Sept. 16, 2013).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any per-
son to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.”).
140. See FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 28(1) (stating that a final determination by the R
Ombud may include “a direction . . . that the authorised financial services provider,
representative or other party concerned take such steps in relation to the complaint as
the Ombud deems appropriate and just.”).
141. See Code of Procedure for Industry Disputes R. 13804, in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9.  The jurisdiction where the events took place or a choice of law agreement signed R
by the parties governs the legal standard for whether a permanent injunction will be
granted.  Code of Procedure for Industry Disputes R. 13804(b)(4), in FINRA MANUAL,
supra note 9. R
142. However, in intra-industry disputes that the code requires to be submitted to
arbitration, “parties may seek a temporary injunctive order from a court of competent
jurisdiction.” Id. Once a court grants the temporary injunction, the FINRA panel holds
an expedited hearing on the merits. See NAT’L ASS’N SEC. DEALER, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 02-
13: INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 78 (Feb. 2002) [hereinafter NASD Notice to Members 02-13], avail-
able at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/
notices/p003765.pdf.
143. The arbitration code for customer disputes does not mention injunctive relief.
However, FINRA has indicated that injunctions are only available in industry disputes.
See NASD Notice to Members 02-13, supra note 142 (“[T]emporary injunctive relief is R
not available in arbitration.  Parties in intra-industry cases may seek temporary injunc-
tive relief in a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
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the materially false or misleading information.144  In South Africa, a strict
liability standard is imposed on FSPs and representatives when conveying
information.145
Because the FINRA rule on misrepresentation does not establish liabil-
ity short of reckless action, it would appear that the U.S. rule provides less
protection for clients.  However, once negligence is taken into account, cli-
ents still are relatively well-protected.  For example, while a broker-dealer
who negligently conveyed unconfirmed information to a client in connec-
tion with a transaction would not violate FINRA Rule 2020— because he or
she did not act with the adequate level of culpability— the broker-dealer
would still be liable for negligence and a violation of Rule 2010.146  Under
the FINRA system, the only instance where a client could be injured with-
out remedy against the broker-dealer would be where the broker-dealer
acted diligently— non-negligently— to check for accuracy, but the informa-
tion was still incorrect and caused a loss for the client.  Thus, while South
Africa definitely holds FSPs to a higher standard regarding misrepresenta-
tion, it is unclear whether the Ombud system offers a “better” substantive
rule.
Another difference is the range of claims that are actionable only in
each of the ADR systems.  In South Africa, the substantive rights of parties
in front of the FAIS Ombud are no different than those of a party in a court
of law.147  Thus, regardless of the root of the substantive right— the FAIS
Act, the FAIS Code or the common law— the client has the option of bring-
ing the action to the Ombud or to court.148  In the U.S., on the other hand,
certain claims like the violation of a FINRA rule are generally only actiona-
ble before a FINRA arbitration panel and not before a court of law.149  For
example, if a client filed a complaint against its broker-dealer in a federal
court, alleging a violation of a FINRA rule as the sole basis of liability, the
court would likely grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim because the violation of a FINRA rule is not, in itself, actionable in
federal court.  This does not mean that the violation of a FINRA rule is not
relevant for actions in court.  Indeed, violation of a FINRA rule is likely
144. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. R
145. See FAIS Code, supra note 17, § 3(1)(a)(i) (“When a provider renders a financial R
service representations made and information provided to a client by the provider must
be factually correct.”) (emphasis added).  Note that the language of the rule does not
require any level of culpability for a violation. Id.
146. See Manaia, No. 2009018818101 (dismissing alleged violation of FINRA Rule
2020 but holding that respondent’s negligent conduct violated FINRA Rule 2010).  If a
broker-dealer or its representative was diligent, she also would not be liable under sec-
tion 12(2) of the Securities Act or section 10(b)— and Rule 10b-5— of the Exchange Act.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77l, 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; Therese H. Maynard, Liability Under
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for Fraudulent Trading in Postdistribution Mar-
kets, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 847, 850– 52 (1991).
147. See Millard, supra note 8, at 237 (“Any conduct that falls short of the standards R
set out by [the FAIS Act and the FAIS Code] is actionable by a client who had suffered
damage or prejudice.”).
148. See id.  However, a client cannot bring an action to the Ombud and to court
simultaneously. See FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 27(3)(b)(i). R
149. See HAZEN, supra note 35, at 153. R
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strong evidence of negligence or other improper behavior.150  However,
violation of a FINRA rule is not a valid cause of action outside of FINRA
arbitration.
Does this mean that the South African system provides more substan-
tive rights than the U.S. system?  It depends on how you define the scope of
the U.S. and South African systems.  If the scope is each country’s entire
investor’s rights scheme— including the rights actionable in courts— then
the South African system provides more rights to investors.  However, the
purpose of this Note is to compare the ADR systems, and therefore, the
“systems” are limited to FINRA arbitration and the FAIS Ombud.  Thus, the
fact that a violation of a FINRA rule is not actionable in court does not
weigh against the U.S. system for the purposes of the substantive rules
criterion.151
Regarding remedies, the U.S. and South African systems depart on the
availability of injunctions.  While the Ombud has the authority to grant
injunctive relief to claimants,152 FINRA omits this option from its customer
code and limits it to the granting of permanent injunctions for intra-indus-
try disputes.153  Although FINRA may have had some reasons for doing
so,154 FINRA’s limitations on granting injunctive relief mean that the U.S.
financial services ADR system has fewer options for making claimants
whole under the substantive rules criterion.
150. See, e.g., Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160, 1163
(S.D. Tex. 1969) (“[V]iolations of [an NASD Rule] would be admissible as evidence of
negligence . . . .”).
151. However, even considering the broader rights of the American investors, there
may be a strong policy reason— outside the criteria mentioned— for the U.S. not to allow
violations of the FINRA rules to be actionable: courts would be usurping Congress’s role
as lawmaker by implying a private cause of action for FINRA rules violations. See
Amnon Wenger, See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Don’t Get Sued: Should a Private Cause of
Action Exist for a Violation of NASD Conduct Rule 3010?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 303,
326– 28 (2005) (discussing policy reasons why private rights of action should not be
implied).  FINRA’s board of governors, which approves FINRA rules, is only accountable
to FINRA members. See By-Laws of the Corporation Art. III sec. 4, in FINRA MANUAL,
supra note 9 (describing the composition of the FINRA Board of Governors).  While not R
being accountable to the greater public may be appropriate— and perhaps even good—
for the purposes of making rules that are enforced against industry members within the
financial services ADR system, it likely is not appropriate in the context of a court of
law, which enforces rules created by politically accountable representatives.  South
Africa does not have the same accountability issue because the FAIS Act was passed by
parliament and the FAIS Code was promulgated under the Act.  Thus, it is perfectly
appropriate for either the Ombud or a court of law to enforce the FAIS Code and the
FAIS Act.
152. See FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 28(1). R
153. See supra notes 141– 143 and accompanying text. R
154. For example, FINRA may have eliminated the availability of temporary injunc-
tions due to the necessary lead time of putting together an arbitration panel.  That is,
because it takes time to assemble arbitrators through the strike and rank system— in
contrast to finding a judge— FINRA may have believed that it was better to leave tempo-
rary injunctions to the courts.  Also, regarding injunctions in customer disputes, FINRA
may have left out the rule because its rule makers believed monetary damages were a
sufficient remedy in the customer dispute context.
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IV. Procedural Rights
A. Pre-filing Requirements
In South Africa, aggrieved clients have the option of either litigation or
ADR before the FAIS Ombud.  However, before bringing a case before the
Ombud, the complainant must first attempt to resolve the dispute with the
respondent.155  Only if the respondent fails to adequately address the com-
plaint within six weeks may a complaint then be submitted to the
Ombud.156  Furthermore, as required by the FAIS Code, FSPs must main-
tain their own internal dispute resolution procedures for investors.157  The
procedures must be fair and, if the dispute cannot be resolved internally,
the institution is required to inform the investors of their rights to external
solutions.158
In the U.S., there are no pre-filing requirements to resolving disputes
before a FINRA arbitration panel.  However, if a respondent wants to use
the FINRA forum and the claimant first tries to bring the action in court,
there is an additional step: the respondent needs to file a motion to compel
arbitration.159  If granted, the judge will either dismiss the case or, more
commonly, order an abatement until the completion of the arbitration pro-
cess.160  Where a complaint before a court has both claims that are arbitral
and claims that are not, the court will generally sever the arbitral claims
and stay judicial proceedings on non-arbitrable claims161 until arbitration
is complete.162
B. Pleading
To properly file a complaint, the claimant “must satisfy the Ombud of
having endeavored to resolve the complaint with the respondent,” by stat-
ing what steps the claimant took to resolve the dispute before resorting to
the Ombud.163  In order for a claim to be sufficient, it must also fall within
the ambit of the FAIS Act and within the rules of the Ombud.164  As dis-
cussed in the previous section on jurisdiction,165 the FAIS Ombud has the
authority to hear a broad range of cases, making this an easy requirement
to meet.166  In a quintessential action, the claimant will allege that (1) the
FSP acted in a negligent manner or in a manner which violated the FAIS Act
155. See FAIS Rules on Proceedings, supra note 86, § 5(b). R
156. Id. § 4(a).
157. FAIS Code, supra note 17, §§ 17– 19. R
158. Id.
159. See Steven D. Urban, Securities Arbitration of Investor Disputes: A Primer for the
Unwary Practitioner, 59 THE ADVOCATE (TEXAS) 11, 11 (2012).
160. Id.
161. The proceedings for the non-arbitrable claims will also generally be stayed.
HAZEN, supra note 91, § 15.1[6]. R
162. Id. § 15.1[4].
163. FAIS Rules on Proceedings, supra note 86, § 5(d). R
164. Id. § 4(a)(i).
165. See supra notes 78– 86 and accompanying text. R
166. Of course, this assumes that an “authorised user” under the Financial Markets
Act did not render the financial service. See supra note 84 and the accompanying text. R
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or the FAIS Code; (2) as a result of the conduct of the FSP, the claimant
suffered financial prejudice; and (3) the prejudice can be quantified as a
particular amount of damages.167  Irrespective of the outcome, when
accepting a complaint, the Ombud may require the respondent to pay a
non-refundable case fee of 1000 Rand.168
Upon receiving the complaint, the Ombud has the right to summarily
dismiss the complaint where, upon the facts presented by the complaint,
“the complaint or relief sought is of the nature that the Ombud can be of no
assistance”; the “complaint does not have any reasonable prospect of suc-
cess”; or the matter has already been resolved by a court or by the FAIS
Ombud.169  The Ombud may also dismiss the complaint if the respondent
has made a reasonable settlement offer.170
Like the requirements for bringing a complaint before the Ombud, the
pleading requirements for FINRA arbitration are loose.  Under the FINRA
rules, the claimant need only file a statement of claim with the relevant
facts and remedy requested.171  However, unlike the South African system,
a case cannot be dismissed for failure to state a claim.172  A panel of arbi-
trators cannot act on a motion to dismiss unless either the non-moving
party previously released the claim or the moving party was not associated
with the account, securities or conduct at issue.173  Thus, regardless of the
merits of the claim, the respondent will be required to continue to defend
the case through the point that the claimant presents his or her case in
chief during the hearing on the merits.174  This has the potential to be
considerably onerous for the respondent, as the evidentiary hearing can be
several months or a year after the complaint is filed.175
C. Statute of Limitations
The complaint must also comply with the time restrictions of the FAIS
Act.  Under the FAIS Act, the Ombud must decline to investigate any com-
plaint relating to an act or omission that occurred more than three years
before the date of receipt, unless the complainant was unaware of the
occurrence.176  If the complainant was unaware, the three-year period
begins on the earlier of the date on which the complainant became aware,
or the date on which the complainant should have reasonably become
167. See Millard, supra note 8, at 236; see, e.g., Mojela v. Estene Brokers, FAIS 00150/ R
08-09/GP/3, at 7 (2012) (S. Afr.) (outlining the requirements for sustaining an action).
168. FAIS Rules on Proceedings, supra note 86, § 9(a)– (b). R
169. Id. § 7.
170. Id.
171. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12302(a), in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
172. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12504, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note
9. R
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 138 (stating that the average overall R
turnaround time for FINRA arbitration is over 14 months).
176. FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 27(3)(a)(i). R
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aware.177  Also, the complainant must file a complaint within six months
after receiving the respondent’s final response regarding the dispute, or
after such response was due.178
Under FINRA rules, the claimant has more time to file,179 as panels
are only restricted from hearing claims where more than six years have
lapsed since the occurrence of the event giving rise to the claim.180
D. Representation
In South Africa, the discretion of the Ombud can have a major impact
on the level of legal expertise to which a party has access.  While the FAIS
Act specifies that the Ombud may allow a party to have legal representa-
tion,181 at least one case has held that the Ombud is not required to do
so.182  Parties’ rights to representation are much stronger under the U.S.
system.  Under FINRA rules, parties may represent themselves183 but
always retain the right to obtain an attorney at law in good standing.184
FINRA will even allow a party to be represented in arbitration by someone
who is not an attorney, so long as the representative is not suspended from
the practice of law or the securities industry and the applicable state law
allows it.185
F. Discovery
In South Africa, once the investigation begins, discovery procedures
are quite flexible, and largely determined by the Ombud.  According to the
FAIS Act, when investigating or deciding a complaint, the Ombud may “fol-
low and implement any procedure (including mediation) which the
Ombud deems appropriate . . . .”186  Accordingly, the rules of procedure
for the Ombud are only seven pages long and list as a fundamental princi-
pal that “[i]n disposing of a complaint the Ombud acts independently and
objectively and takes no instructions from any person regarding the exer-
177. Id. § 27(3)(a)(ii).
178. FAIS Rules on Proceedings, supra note 86, § 5(c). R
179. However, it is important to remember that there might be other state or federal
time limitations, depending on the type of claim. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77m (listing the
time limitations for an action under section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act).
180. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12206, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note
9.  However, dismissal of a claim under Rule 12206 does not prohibit a party from pur- R
suing a claim in court. Id.
181. FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 27(5)(a). R
182. Risk v. Ombud for Financial Services Providers, no. 38791/2011, 1 (HC) at
12– 15 paras. 39– 45 (2012) (S. Afr.) (declining to declare section 27(5)(a) of the FAIS
Act unconstitutional and stating that “Section 27 is written in a language that clearly
demonstrates the intention of the legislature . . . .  [T]he Ombud ‘may’ follow any proce-
dure she considers appropriate including allowing representation.  [But s]he is not
obliged to do so.”).
183. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12208, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note
9. R
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 27(5)(a). R
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cise of [his or her] authority.”187  The rules also state that parties may
submit any information or documents they think are relevant, but they
must produce everything requested by the Ombud.188  However, all infor-
mation produced is confidential.189
U.S. discovery procedures are more concrete.  For the purposes of arbi-
tration, FINRA has a list of presumptively discoverable materials, known as
the Discovery Guide.190  The Discovery Guide includes, among other
things, any documentation of correspondence and agreements between the
parties relating to the dispute as well as any papers indicating the client’s
risk tolerance or the broker-dealer’s investment strategy.191  If a party to
the dispute refuses to produce something that has been requested, the
other side may file a motion to compel discovery, and the arbitrator will
decide the outcome.192  The Discovery Guide states that parties are not
required to produce documents that are privileged.193  However, unlike
documents produced to the Ombud, not all documents produced to the
opposing party must be treated as confidential, and the burden of estab-
lishing confidentiality is on the party asserting it.194
G. Appeals
Once the merits of a case are decided, the Ombud must give a written
decision.195  If the Ombud gives a party an adverse determination, the
party has the right to appeal the determination to the Board of Appeals,
which was established by the Financial Services Board Act.196  To do so,
the party must apply to the Ombud in writing within one month for leave
to appeal.197  In deciding whether to grant leave, the Ombud considers the
complexity of the matter and the reasonable likelihood that the Board may
reach a different conclusion.198  If leave is denied, then the party may ask
for leave from the Board of Appeals directly within one month of the
refusal.199  If the Board of Appeals grants leave and makes a decision, its
determination may be enforced as if it were issued in a civil proceeding of a
187. FAIS Rules on Proceedings, supra note 86, § 2.  Indeed, any action before the R
Ombud that would constitute contempt of court in traditional litigation, such as refus-
ing an order to produce a document, can be penalized in the same manner as contempt
of court. See id. § 31(a).
188. Id. §§ 5(f), 6(d).
189. Id. § 11(b).
190. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12506, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note
9. R
191. See DISCOVERY GUIDE, supra note 51, at 4– 5. R
192. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12509, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note
9. R
193. See DISCOVERY GUIDE, supra note 51, at 3. R
194. Id.
195. FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 28(4)(a). R
196. Id. § 39. See also Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 § 26A (S. Afr.).  The
Minister of Finance appoints the board members, at least two of whom are experienced
attorneys or judges. Id.
197. FAIS Rules on Proceedings, supra note 86, § 12. R
198. FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 28(5)(b)(i). R
199. FAIS Rules on Proceedings, supra note 86, § 12(e). R
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High Court of South Africa.200
Contrary to the South African procedure, there is no appeals process
within the FINRA system.201  Once an award is handed down, the party
against whom the award is rendered must pay within thirty days.  The only
recourse that the party can take is filing a motion to vacate the award in a
court of competent jurisdiction.202  Motions to vacate arbitration awards
are not easily granted.  The Federal Arbitration Act provides only four
grounds for vacating an award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2)
where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbe-
havior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where
the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.203
And the Act only provides three grounds for modifying an award:
(a) [w]here there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an
evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property
referred to in the award[;] (b) [w]here the arbitrators have awarded upon a
matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of
the decision upon the matter submitted[; and] (c) [w]here the award is
imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.204
While the Supreme Court has stated that these are not the exclusive
grounds for reviewing arbitration awards,205 other standards of review that
have been used, such as “manifest disregard for the law,”206 are still
extremely difficult to satisfy.
In addition, FINRA rules compound the difficulty of vacating or modi-
fying awards by allowing arbitrators to give awards without explana-
200. Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 § 26B(17) (S. Afr.).
201. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Decision & Award, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Arbi-
trationAndMediation/Arbitration/Process/DecisionAwards/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
202. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12904, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note
9 (“All monetary awards shall be paid within 30 days of receipt unless a motion to vacate R
has been filed with a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
203. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
204. 9 U.S.C. § 11.
205. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008) (“In holding that
§§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the review provided by the statute, we do not
purport to say that they exclude more searching review based on authority outside the
statute as well.  The FAA is not the only way into court for parties wanting review of
arbitration awards . . . .]”).
206. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 665 F.3d 444, 451 (2d Cir.
2011) (“[W]e have held that the court may set aside an arbitration award if it was ren-
dered in ‘manifest disregard of the law.’”); Fukaya Trading Co., S.A. v. E. Marine Corp.,
322 F. Supp. 278, 282 (E.D. La. 1971) (“An arbitration award is subject to review by this
Court and will be vacated only if the award was made in manifest disregard of the law.”).
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tions.207  In fact, in order to receive an explained decision, all parties must
request it prior to the prehearing document exchange, and they must pay
an additional four hundred dollars.208  A lack of an opinion is detrimental
to a party seeking review because, regardless of the standard of review, it is
very difficult to convince a judge that the standard has been met when
there is no opinion for the judge to work from.  Furthermore, because the
testimony of arbitrators impeaching their own awards is generally inadmis-
sible,209 those seeking to vacate an award face an even more difficult task.
H. Enforcement and Effects of a Judgment
In South Africa, the final determination of the Ombud has the same
effect as that of a civil court.210  Immediately after a determination is
made, a clerk or registrar of the South African court, which would have had
jurisdiction over the case, may issue a writ of execution.211  Two weeks
after the determination, a sheriff of that court may execute the award.212
The award may contain costs and fees, including legal costs,213 which are
determined by the Ombud.214  The determination must be written.215
Once the Ombud issues the determination, it is reported on the
Internet.216
Arbitration awards from FINRA panels are treated in a slightly differ-
ent fashion.  Like the Ombud’s determinations, all awards are made pub-
lic.217  However, a FINRA arbitration award need only state certain
minimal information, not including the underlying rationale for the
award.218  FINRA awards, like other arbitration awards, require the addi-
207. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12904(e), (f), in FINRA MANUAL,
supra note 9. R
208. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12904(g), in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
209. See, e.g., Meer Corp. v. Farmella Trading Corp., 178 N.Y.S.2d 784, 786 (Sup. Ct.
1958) (“[T]he testimony of an arbitrator is inadmissible to impeach an award he has
signed . . . .”); Fukaya Trading Co., 322 F. Supp. at 279 (“The authorities generally hold
that the testimony of an arbitrator tending to impeach the award is incompetent and
should be rejected.”).
210. See FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 28(5). R
211. See id. § 28(6).
212. Id.
213. See Millard, supra note 8, at 243 n.86. R
214. See FAIS Rules on Proceedings, supra note 86, § 9. R
215. FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 28(4)(a). R
216. See Millard, supra note 8, at 244; Determinations, OFFICE OF THE OMBUD FOR R
FINANCIAL SERVICES PROVIDERS, http://www.faisombud.co.za/determinations.
217. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12904(h), in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
218. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12904(f), in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9.  The award must contain the names of the parties, their representatives, and the R
arbitrators; an acknowledgement by the arbitrators that they have each read the plead-
ings and other materials filed by the parties; a summary of the issues, including the
type(s) of any security or product in controversy; the damages and other relief requested
and awarded; a statement of any other issues resolved; the allocation of forum fees and
any other fees allocable by the panel; the dates on which the claim was filed and the
award was rendered; the dates and locations of hearing sessions; and the signatures of
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tional step of having a judgment entered by a court in order for the awards
to be legally enforceable.219  But entering a judgment and having it
enforced usually is not necessary because failing to pay an arbitration
award is a violation of FINRA rules,220 and FINRA members can face stiff
sanctions for such a violation.221  In the case where the award is entered
against a non-FINRA member, having a judgment entered in any court of
competent jurisdiction is necessary for the party desiring to enforce the
award.222
I. Comparison
Comparing the procedures in the FAIS Ombud and FINRA arbitration
systems illuminates a number of significant differences.  First, the South
African requirement223 of attempting to resolve a dispute before entering
the Ombud system implicates the efficiency and accessibility criteria.
While it presents an additional hurdle for potential claimants, limiting effi-
ciency and accessibility in the short run, the requirement encourages the
amicable resolution of disputes between clients and FSPs before resorting
to costly arbitration.  Thus, in the long run, this feature likely encourages
the efficient resolution of disputes.  Furthermore, because negotiations
between the client and FSP are not binding— that is, the client always has
the option of going to the Ombud— the client’s accessibility to the forum is
only marginally limited.
Second, while the pleading requirements under both systems are rela-
tively loose, the near complete absence of a summary dismissal device224
in FINRA arbitration is problematic.  One of the policies behind the weak-
the arbitrators. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12904(e), in FINRA MANUAL,
supra note 9. R
219. However, a judgment can only be entered based on an arbitration award if either
(a) the parties agreed to have the award be enforceable in their arbitration agreement, or
(b) the rules of arbitration, which the arbitration agreement adopts by reference, say so.
2 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 28:81 (West 2013). In the case of
FINRA arbitration, the rules which are adopted are those of FINRA, which do allow for a
judgment to be entered. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12904(a), in FINRA
MANUAL, supra note 9. R
220. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12000, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note
9 (“ It may be deemed conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade R
and a violation of Rule 2010 for a member or a person associated with a member to . . .
fail to honor an award, or comply with a written and executed settlement
agreement . . . .”).
221. Investigations and Sanctions R. 8310, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 9 (listing the R
following: “(1) censure a member or person associated with a member; (2) impose a fine
upon a member or person associated with a member; (3) suspend the membership of a
member or suspend the registration of a person associated with a member for a definite
period or a period contingent on the performance of a particular act; (4) expel a mem-
ber, cancel the membership of a member, or revoke or cancel the registration of a person
associated with a member; [or] (5) suspend or bar a member or person associated with a
member from association with all members”).
222. Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12904(a), in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
223. See FAIS Rules on Proceedings, supra note 86, § 5(b). R
224. See supra notes 171– 175 and accompanying text. R
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ened summary dismissal device is keeping the cost of arbitration down by
protecting claimants’ attorneys from being required to oppose frivolous
motions for summary dismissal.  While this policy is very much in line
with the efficiency criterion, the result of this rule is that respondents are
completely unable to protect themselves from frivolous claims.  For exam-
ple, it is possible for a claimant to force a respondent to go through a full
hearing by alleging facts that do not constitute any legal basis for relief
under federal, state or SRO rules, so long as the claimant can show that the
respondent was somehow associated with the account, securities or con-
duct at issue.225  This result is both tremendously inefficient as well as
procedurally unfair because of the potential for abuse by a claimant look-
ing to extort a brokerage firm or its representative.
Third, the FAIS Ombud and FINRA systems are markedly different in
their approaches to the right of legal representation.  The Ombud, in addi-
tion to his or her already substantial authority, may further disarm the
parties by disallowing the use of legal representation.226  While the goal of
this approach may be to expedite the resolution process or to even the play-
ing field between parties— in the case where an FSP is well-represented and
a claimant is not— taking away a party’s right to legal representation has an
enormous cost in terms of procedural fairness.  In addition, doing so may
have the effect of slowing down the proceeding where an unsophisticated
party does not understand the Ombud system.227
Fourth, the discovery procedure under the Ombud is different in that
it does not rely as heavily on the adversarial roles of the parties as does the
American system.  Rather, it relies on the discretion and judgment of the
Ombud to determine what is relevant.  While the parties may submit docu-
ments and information, the Ombud has the ultimate authority to request
what will be produced.228  In FINRA arbitration, by contrast, a panel may
suggest that a party submit supporting documents or it may grant a party’s
motion to compel discovery,229 but the system primarily relies on the par-
ties and the Discovery Guide to decide which materials are relevant.
The potential benefits of the Ombud’s discovery method are that the
Ombud can pursue factual inquiries neither party had thought to present,
and discovery may be quicker because there is no fighting between the
parties over document production.  However, the drawbacks far outweigh
the potential benefits.  First, giving the Ombud sole discretion over the pro-
ceedings risks missing important issues.  For example, the Ombud may fail
to request an important document that one of the parties otherwise would
225. See supra notes 171– 175 and accompanying text. R
226. See supra notes 181– 182 and accompanying text. R
227. See Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 439, 449 (2009) (“[S]elf-represented claimants slow[ ] the clearing of
court dockets.  Pro se litigants today cause delays and increase administrative costs.
They are likely to miss or be unprepared for scheduled courtroom sessions, thereby
forcing adjournments and rescheduling.”).
228. See FAIS Rules on Proceedings, supra note 86, §§ 2, 5– 6. R
229. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12509, in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
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have requested.  Second, the current loose discovery rules could lead to
results that neither party desires.  For example, the Ombud could order a
party to produce sensitive materials that the other party does not want and
would not have requested.230  Lastly, the Ombud system’s lack of basic
guidance on discovery rules makes discovery unpredictable and potentially
arbitrary.  By contrast, parties before a FINRA panel at least have the bene-
fit of knowing— though the Discovery Guide— the minimum of what they
will be required to produce and can thus prepare in advance.  Considering
the foregoing, the costs of the Ombud’s discovery method in terms of pro-
cedural fairness likely outweigh any of its possible benefits.
Lastly, comparing the Ombud and FINRA systems highlights the diffi-
culty of appealing an award under the American system.  Given the high
levels of deference provided to arbitration awards and the practice of giving
unreasoned awards, vacating or modifying an award is extremely difficult.
While this practice could be justified on efficiency grounds if both parties
chose to arbitrate beforehand, the reality is that, in the securities ADR con-
text, neither broker-dealers nor clients really choose arbitration; rather, it is
forced upon them.231  Thus, both parties in FINRA arbitration are exposed
to the risk that an arbitration panel will make a poor decision that is func-
tionally unappealable.  This weighs heavily against the U.S. system in terms
of its procedural fairness.
Conclusion
Having compared the FINRA and FAIS Ombud systems in Parts I
through IV, this Note finds that there are a number of features of the South
African system that may be preferable to those in the United States’ system.
Table 1 summarizes the differences and identifies which system has the
better approach in terms of the criterion listed.  The remainder of Part V
will highlight the important differences between the South African and
American systems and suggest beneficial changes to the FINRA model.
230. However, because all the materials produced are confidential, this potential
drawback may be less problematic. See FAIS Rules on Proceedings, supra note 86, R
§ 11(b).
231. Arbitration is forced upon clients through the near universal use of arbitration
agreements when they open accounts. See Urban, supra note 159, at 11 (“[V]irtually all R
investor disputes which traditionally would have been resolved by a judge and a jury are
subject to mandatory, binding arbitration before FINRA.  Why is this?  It is because all
BDs include a predispute arbitration agreement in their account agreements with their
customers that encompasses virtually any dispute that later arises.”).  Arbitration is also
forced upon broker-dealers and their representatives through FINRA’s own rules. See
Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12200, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 9. R
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Procedural Substantive
Difference Efficiency Fairness Accessibility Rules
State vs. SRO System * * * Unclear
Min Adjudicator Qualifications * R.S.A. * *
Adjudicator Selection * U.S. * *
Securities Disputes * * U.S. *
Insurance Disputes * * R.S.A. *
Source of Jurisdiction * * Unclear *
Mandatory Arbitration * Unclear * *
Intra Industry Disputes * * U.S. *
Misrepresentation * * * Unclear
Actionability of ADR Code * N/A * N/A
Remedies (injunction) * * * R.S.A.
Pre-Filing Requirement R.S.A. * U.S. *
Summary Disposition R.S.A. R.S.A. * *
Representation * U.S. * *
Discovery * U.S. * *
Appeals U.S. R.S.A. * *
Note: The designation of “U.S.” or “R.S.A” means that the U.S. or South African approach,
respectively, tends to perform better based on the vertically listed criterion.  An asterisk
indicates that the difference in the South African and U.S. rules likely has only minor
implications with respect to the listed criterion.  “Unclear” means that, while the difference
between each jurisdiction’s rules or features is significant, it is unclear which system’s feature
or rule performs better under the criterion.  “N/A” means that the rule or feature in question
implicates the listed criterion but is outside the scope of this Note.
A. Institutional Comparison: State vs. SRO and Adjudicator Selection
While the ADR systems in the U.S. and South Africa have similar
goals— resolving disputes in an efficient and just manner— different types
of actors govern the two ADR systems and their rule-making processes.  In
South Africa, the office of the FAIS Ombud is a state institution with the
Ombud appointed by government officials.232  In the U.S., FINRA is an
SRO in the form of a corporation.  FINRA members elect a board of gover-
nors composed of a mix of public representatives and industry members to
govern FINRA.233  As discussed in Part I, there are competing arguments
over the effectiveness of SROs in regulating the financial services indus-
try.234  However, for the purposes of comparing ADR systems, both FINRA
and the South African rule makers have produced— with the slight excep-
tion of misrepresentation— similar substantive rules.  Thus, it is not clear
whether the SRO or state-based model will tend to produce better substan-
tive rules.
Regarding the adjudicators, while the structure of the American system
allows for arbitrators who may be less legally sophisticated, it does a better
job of promoting neutrality because the panel consists of a mix of public
232. See FAIS Act, supra note 9, § 21(1)(a). R
233. See By-Laws of the Corporation Art. III sec. 4, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 9. R
234. See supra notes 58– 64 and accompanying text. R
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and industry arbitrators, and parties have the ability to strike arbitrators
with biased arbitration records.235  Thus, while FINRA should retain the
strike and rank system, it should also consider increasing the minimum
eligibility requirements of FINRA arbitrators to reduce the risk that they
will make arbitration decisions on an uninformed basis.
B. Jurisdiction: Services Types, Source, Access to Courts, and Intra-
Industry Disputes
The disputes that the ADR systems in South Africa and the U.S. can
hear are largely dependent on the type of financial service rendered and
who rendered it.  The FAIS Ombud is excluded from hearing disputes
involving securities transactions of authorized users of licensed exchanges,
and FINRA is limited to hearing disputes involving a FINRA member.  This
means that FINRA is relatively more accessible for securities disputes,
while the Ombud system is more receptive to financial services claims
involving insurance.
The financial services ADR systems in South Africa and the U.S. derive
their jurisdiction from different sources.  The FAIS Ombud’s jurisdiction
comes from statute, whereas FINRA’s derives from a combination of the
Federal Arbitration Act and the arbitration agreement.  While the addi-
tional requirement of an agreement could theoretically limit access, FINRA
rules make certain that every client of a FINRA member can take its case to
arbitration.  Thus, assuming proper subject matter, claimants who want to
enter the ADR realm have comparable access under either system.
The opposite, however, is not true.  While claimants in South Africa
have the option of ADR or litigation, the widespread use of arbitration
clauses in the U.S. has functionally made FINRA arbitration a requirement
for claimants.  At first glance, this makes the U.S. system look less proce-
durally fair relative to South Africa.  However, after considering the choice-
of-venue interests of respondents in South Africa— along with the other
considerations in Part II— the comparison becomes more balanced.
Regarding their ability to hear intra-industry disputes, both ADR sys-
tems can hear complaints between industry members who are in a client-
provider relationship.236  However, because the FAIS Ombud is capped in
the Rand value of the disputes he or she is allowed to hear, it is unlikely
that an industry member seeking a substantial sum from an FSP would
have access to the Ombud’s venue.  Applying the second criterion, this
means that the cap in the South African system has a negative impact on
accessibility with regards to intra-industry disputes.
C. Substantive Rights
Comparing some of the most common substantive rights relating to
investments— suitability, unauthorized trading, misrepresentation, and
235. See Code of Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12400(a), in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 9. R
236. For a discussion of this, see supra notes 114– 116 and accompanying text. R
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negligent rendering of a financial service— both the American and South
African systems provide roughly the same protection for clients.  As dis-
cussed in Part III, while the FINRA rule on misrepresentation only protects
clients where a broker-dealer or its representative acts recklessly or pur-
posefully,237 the rule on negligence fills the gap, leaving clients without a
right of action only where the broker-dealer acted non-negligently in con-
veying information.  Thus, while the Ombud rule treats financial advisors
more harshly, it does not follow that the FINRA rule is necessarily inade-
quate in protecting clients.
Another important difference is that violation of a FINRA rule is not
actionable in U.S. courts, while violations of the FAIS Code are actionable
in South African courts.238  While this difference has an impact on the
substantive rights of financial services clients outside the ADR system, it
does not speak to clients’ substantive rights within.  Therefore, this differ-
ence does not weigh one way or the other in terms of which system has the
more preferable feature.
Turning to remedies, FINRA panels cannot grant temporary injunc-
tions and may only grant permanent injunctions in industry disputes.239
The Ombud, on the other hand, can do both in any type of case, giving
claimants a broader range of substantive rights.  Thus, FINRA should con-
sider expanding its ability to grant injunctions.240
D. Procedural Rights
In the area of procedure, there are a number of significant differences
between the two systems that present opportunities for improvement for
the American system.  First, the Ombud requires that parties attempt to
resolve the dispute internally before filing a complaint.241  FINRA should
strongly consider adopting a similar feature.  While it would require an
additional step that might mildly limit access, such a rule would also
encourage early settlement and increase overall efficiency without depriv-
ing the claimant of the right to arbitration.242
Second, the lack of any meaningful procedural tool for summarily dis-
missing a claim has the potential to force respondents in FINRA arbitration
237. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. R
238. See supra notes 114– 115 and accompanying text. R
239. See supra notes 141– 143 and accompanying text. R
240. Of course, whether FINRA actually should is a question of policy.  If FINRA does
expand panels’ ability to grant injunctive relief, it may want to expand the availability of
permanent injunctions in customer cases.  As discussed previously, the nature of arbi-
trator selection makes it very difficult to bring a panel together quickly, and temporary
injunctions tend to be very time sensitive.  Thus, as a practical matter, it might be better
for courts to continue to handle temporary injunctions.
241. See FAIS Rules on Proceedings, supra note 86, § 5(b). R
242. Some financial services firms already have an internal dispute resolution system
in place. See, e.g., Office of the Ombudsman, ROYAL BANK OF CANADA, http://www.rbc.
com/ombudsman/ (last accessed Oct. 13, 2013).  For those firms that do not have a
dispute resolution system, simply requiring claimants to discuss the matter with their
broker representative or a branch manager could also be beneficial for both parties and
would not require any additional costs for the brokerage firm.
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to defend meritless claims.  Like the Ombud,243 FINRA should consider
adopting a meaningful tool for summary dismissal.  Implementing such a
device would benefit the FINRA system’s efficiency and procedural
fairness.
Lastly, the relative difficulty of gaining review of an arbitration award
in the U.S. severely limits the procedural rights of parties before a FINRA
arbitration panel.244  While the inability to appeal within FINRA could be
justifiable on efficiency grounds if arbitration was optional, the reality is
that it is not.  Thus, the U.S. should consider implementing a mechanism
that allows for increased review of FINRA awards.245
243. FAIS Rules on Proceedings, supra note 86, § 7.
244. For a discussion of this, see supra notes 195– 209 and accompanying text. R
245. This could be done through any of the following: (1) creating an internal system
of review within FINRA; (2) giving parties greater access to traditional litigation; (3)
softening the standard of review for FINRA arbitration awards; or (4) requiring FINRA
arbitrators to write an unpublished written decision that could be subpoenaed in an
action to overturn an award.  Of these, the first and fourth would be the easiest to imple-
ment, while the second and third may require congressional action to amend the Federal
Arbitration Act, something that would not be undertaken lightly.
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